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Abstract
A significant progress has been made in deep-learning based
Automatic Essay Scoring (AES) systems in the past two
decades. The performance commonly measured by the stan-
dard performance metrics like Quadratic Weighted Kappa
(QWK), and accuracy points to the same. However, testing on
common-sense adversarial examples of these AES systems
reveal their lack of natural language understanding capability.
Inspired by common student behaviour during examinations,
we propose a task agnostic adversarial evaluation scheme for
AES systems to test their natural language understanding ca-
pabilities and overall robustness.
1 Introduction
Automated Essay Scoring (AES) uses computer programs
to automatically characterize the performance of examinees
on standardized tests involving writing prose. The earliest
mention of scoring as a scientific study dates back to the
nineteenth century (Spolsky 1995) and automatic scoring,
specifically, to the 1960s (Whitlock 1964). The field started
in 1960s with Ajay, Page and Tillet (Ajay, Tillet, and Page
1973) scoring the essays of their students on punch cards.
The essay was converted to a number of features which was
passed through a linear regression model to produce a score.
Since then, the field has undergone major changes which
transformed the punch cards to microphones and keyboards,
and linear regression techniques on manually extracted fea-
tures to deep neural networks. However, over the years, the
interpretability of the system has gone down and the evalu-
ation methodologies (i.e. accuracy and kappa measurement)
have largely remained the same. While the previous meth-
ods relied on feature engineering, today the model design-
ers rely on neural networks to automatically extract patterns
from the dataset to score.
The common performance metric that has been widely
used in the field is Quadratic Weighted Kappa (QWK). It
measures the agreement between the scoring model and the
human expert. According to this performance metric, with
time, the automatic essay scoring models have reached the
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level of humans (Kumar et al. 2019) or even ‘surpassed’
them (Shermis and Hamner 2012). However, as our experi-
ments show, despite achieving parity with humans on QWK
scores, models are not able to score in the same manner as
humans do. We demonstrate in the later parts of the paper
that heavily modifying responses or even adding false infor-
mation to them, does not break the scoring systems and the
models still maintain their high confidence and scores while
evaluating the adversarial responses.
In this work, we propose an adversarial evaluation of AES
systems. We show the evaluation scheme on Automated Stu-
dent Assessment Prize (ASAP) dataset for Essay-Scoring
(ASAP-AES 2012). Our evaluation scheme consists of eval-
uating AES systems on those inputs which are derived from
the original responses but modified heavily to change its
original meaning. These tests are mostly designed to check
for the overstability of the different models. An overview
of the adversarial scheme is given in Table 1. We try out
the following operations for generating responses: Addition,
Deletion, Modification and Generation. Under these four op-
erations, we include many other operation subtypes such as
adding Wikipedia lines, modifying the grammar of the re-
sponse, taking only first part of the response, etc. As the
human evaluation results show (Section 4.1), when these
adversarial responses are shown to them, they perceive the
responses as ill-formed, lacking coherence and logic. How-
ever, our results demonstrate that no published model is ro-
bust to these examples. They largely maintain the scores
of the unmodified original response even after all the ad-
versarial modifications. This indicates that the models are
largely overstable and unable to distinguish ill-formed ex-
amples from the well-formed ones. While, on average, the
humans reduce their score by approx 3-4 points (on a nor-
malized 1-10 scale), the models are highly overstable and
either increase the score for some tests or reduce them for
others by only 0-2 points.
We also argue that for deep learning based systems, track-
ing merely QWK as an evaluation metric is suboptimal for
several reasons: 1) While subsequent research papers show
an iterative improvement in QWK, yet most of them fail
in evaluating how their works generalize across all the dif-
ferent dimensions of scoring including coherence, cohesion,
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vocabulary, and even surface metrics like average length of
sentences, word difficulty, etc. 2) QWK as a metric captures
only the overall agreement with humans scores, however,
scoring as a science includes knowledge from many do-
mains of NLP like: fact-checking, discourse and coherence,
coreference resolution, grammar, content coverage, etc. A
neural network normally tries to learn all of them at one
go, which as the results demonstrate is probably not able to
learn. Therefore, QWK instead of taking the field in the right
direction is abstracting out all the details associated with
scoring as a task. 3) It does not indicate the direction of a
machine learning model: oversensitivity or overstability. We
quantitatively illustrate the gravity of all these aspects by
performing statistical and manual evaluations. We propose
that instead of tracking just QWK for evaluating a model,
the field should track QWK for performance and adversarial
evaluation of the models for
We would also like to acknowledge that we are not the
only researchers to notice the problem of lack of comprehen-
siveness of scoring with neural networks. Many researchers
prior to us have shown that AES models are either easily
fooled or pay attention to wrong features for scoring. (Perel-
man 2014) argued that the then current state-of-the-art sys-
tems showed a heavy correlation with just number of words.
In (Reinertsen and others 2018), the authors observe that the
Australian eWrite AES system was rejecting those writings
which did not match the style of their training samples and
this is not good for a broad-based systems like AS systems.
In (West-Smith, Butler, and Mayfield 2018), the authors note
that there is no systematic framework for evaluating a mod-
els fit for learning purposes in either academic or industry
applications. This leads to a lack of trust in high-stakes pro-
cesses such as AES evaluation in those circumstances where
high skepticism is already commonplace. Similarly, Perel-
man designed Basic Automatic B.S. Essay Language Gen-
erator (BABEL) (Perelman et al. 2014a) to test out and show
that the state-of-the-art AI systems can be fooled by crudely
written prose as well (Perelman et al. 2014b). We also use
BABEL for one of the tests in our framework (namely BA-
BELGEN given in Section 3.4).
Finally, we would like to say that we present our argu-
ment not as a criticism of anyone, but as an effort to refocus
research directions of the field. Since the automated systems
that we develop as a community have such high stakes, the
research should reflect the same rigor. We sincerely hope to
inspire higher quality reportage of the results in automated
scoring community which does not track just performance
but also the validity of their models.
2 Task and Setup
2.1 Task
We used the widely cited ASAP-AES (ASAP-AES 2012)
dataset for the evaluation of Automatic Essay Scoring sys-
tems. ASAP-AES has been used for automatically scoring
essay responses by many research studies. (Taghipour and
Ng 2016; EASE 2013; Tay et al. 2018; Zhao et al. 2017). It
is one of the largest publicly available datasets. The relevant
statistics for ASAP-AES are listed in Table 2. The questions
covered by the dataset are from many different areas such as
Sciences and English. The responses were written by high
school students and were subsequently double-scored.
2.2 Models
We evaluate the recent state-of-the-art deep learning and
feature engineering models. We show the adversarial-
evaluation results for five such models: (EASE 2013;
Taghipour and Ng 2016; Tay et al. 2018; Zhao et al. 2017;
Liu, Xu, and Zhu 2019).
EASE is an open-source feature-engineering model main-
tained by EdX (EASE 2013). This model is based on many
features such as tags, prompt-word overlap, n-gram based
features, etc. Originally, it ranked third among the 154 par-
ticipating teams in the ASAP-AES competition.
(Taghipour and Ng 2016) uses CNN-LSTM based neu-
ral networks with a few mean-over-time layers. They report
5.6% improvement of QWK on top of the EASE feature-
engineering model.
SkipFlow (Tay et al. 2018) provides another deep learn-
ing architecture that is said to improve on the vanilla neural
networks. The authors also mention that SkipFlow captures
coherence, flow and semantic relatedness over time which
they call as the neural coherence features. They also say that
essays being long sequences are difficult for a model to cap-
ture. For this reason, SkipFlow involves access to intermedi-
ate states. By doing this, it shows an increase of 6% over
EASE feature engineering model and 10% over a vanilla
LSTM model.
(Zhao et al. 2017) use memory-networks for AS where
they select some responses for each grade. These responses
are stored in the memory and then used for scoring ungraded
responses. The memory component helps to characterize the
various score levels similar to what a rubric does. They com-
pare their results with the EASE based model and show bet-
ter performance on 7 out of 8 prompts.
(Liu, Xu, and Zhu 2019) is a recent work where the
authors claim to improve performance on adversarial re-
sponses to AS systems. They achieve this by including some
adversarial generated samples in the training data of the
model. They consider two types of adversarial evaluation:
well-written permuted paragraphs and prompt-irrelevant es-
says1. For these, they develop a two-stage learning frame-
work where they calculate semantic, coherence and prompt-
relevance scores and concatenate them with engineered fea-
tures. The paper uses advance contextual embeddings viz,
BERT (Devlin et al. 2018) for extracting sentence embed-
dings. However, they do not give any analysis for disam-
biguating the performance gain due to BERT and the other
techniques that they apply. We use their model to show how
much models that are dependent on even advanced embed-
dings like BERT can learn about tasks like coherence, rele-
vance to the prompt, relatedness and other things which the
test framework captures.
1Both of these evaluation criteria were explained in (Kumar et
al. 2019)
# Category Test Name Description
1 ADD ADDWIKIRELATED Addition of Wikipedia lines related to the essay question in a response
ADDWIKIUNRELATED Addition of Wikipedia lines unrelated to the essay question in a response.
REPEATSENT Repetition of some lines of the response within a response.
ADDSONG Addition of song lyrics into the response.
ADDSPEECH Addition of excerpts of speeches of popular leaders into a response
ADDRC Addition of lines from Reading Comprehension based questions into a responses.
ADDTRUTH Addition of True lines into a responses.
ADDLIES Addition of Universally false lines into a responses
2 DELETE DELSTART Deletion of lines from the beginning of a response.
DELEND Deletion of lines from the end of a response.
DELRAND Deletion of random lines from a response.
3 MODIFY MODGRAMMAR Modifying the sentences in a response to have incorrect grammar.
MODFLUENCY Inducing dis-fluency in the sentences of a response.
MODLEXICON Paraphrasing words in the sentences with their respective synonyms in a response.
SHUFFLESENT Randomly shuffling the sentences in a response.
4 GENERATE BABELGEN Using the essay generated by Babel as a response.
Table 1: Overview of the testing scheme for Automatic Scoring (AS) models
Prompt Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
#Responses 1783 1800 1726 1772 1805 1800 1569 723
Score Range 2-12 1-6 0-3 0-3 0-4 0-4 0-30 0-60
#Avg words per response 350 350 150 150 150 150 250 650
#Avg sentences per response 23 20 6 4 7 8 12 35
Type Argumentative Argumentative RC RC RC RC Narrative Narrative
Table 2: Overview of the ASAP AES Dataset used for evaluation of AS systems. (RC = Reading Comprehension)
2.3 Standard Evaluation
Both the original competition in which the dataset was re-
leased and the papers referenced, use Quadratic Weighted
Kappa (QWK) as the evaluation metric. Given observed
scores matrix O, weights w and expected score matrix E,
number of possible scores N , QWK is calculated as
k = 1− ΣijwijOij/ΣijwijEij
Oij measures number of students who received a score i
by the first grader and j by the second one. Weight matrix
is defined as wij = (i− j)2/(N − 1)2. The value extracted
by choosing human and machine scores is then compared
with the value calculated by choosing two human graders. It
is considered better if the machine-human agreement score
(QWK) is as close as possible to human-human agreement
score.
3 Adversarial Evaluation
3.1 General Framework
Given a prompt p, response r, bounded size criterion c1,
position criterion c2 and optionally a model f , an adver-
sary A converts response r to response r′ based on a spe-
cific set of rules and the criteria c1 and c2. The criterion c1
defines the percentage c1 upto which the original response
has to be changed by the adversarial perturbation such that
|Len(r′)− Len(r)|/Len(r) = c1. We try out different val-
ues of c1 ({10, 15, 20, 25}). The criterion c2 defines the posi-
tion of inducing adversarial perturbation. We consider three
positions ({START, MID, END}) by dividing the response
r into three equal-sized portions. For the consideration of
space, we only report a subset of these results. A complete
listing of all the results is provided in the supplementary.
For the model f using the scores f(r) and f(r′), we
calculate the following statistics: number of negatively im-
pacted samples (Nneg = number of r s.t., f(r) < f(r′)),
number of positively impacted samples (Npos = num-
ber of r s.t., f(r) > f(r′)), mean difference (µ =
Σ(f(r) − f(r′))/N), absolute mean difference (µabs =
|Σ(f(r) − f(r′))|/N), standard deviation of the difference
(σ =
√
Σ(f(r)− f(r′)− µ)2/N), mean difference of neg-
ative impacted samples (µneg = Σ(f(r) − f(r′))/N s.t.
f(r) < f(r′)) and mean difference of positively impacted
samples (µ = Σ(f(r′)− f(r))/N s.t. f(r) > f(r′)). Since
the score ranges and the number of samples vary across all
the prompts, we report the corresponding values in percent-
ages (percentage of total samples and percentage of range of
score). For knowing un-normalized values, readers are en-
couraged to look into the supplementary.
Using human evaluation (Section 4.1) and relevant statis-
tics (Section 4), we make sure that an adversary A satisfies
the following two conditions. First, according to a human,
the score of an adversarial response (r′) should always be
lesser than the score of the original response (r). In other
words, no adversary should increase the quality of the re-
sponse. Second, a human should be able to detect and dif-
ferentiate r from r′. Notably, these requirements are differ-
ent from what is “commonly” given in the adversarial liter-
ature where the adversarial response is formed such that a
human is not able to detect any difference between the origi-
nal and modified responses but a model (due to its adversar-
ial weakness) is able to detect differences and thus changes
its output. For example, in computer vision a few pixels are
modified to make the model mispredict a bus as an ostrich
(Szegedy et al. 2013) and in NLP, paraphrasing is done to
churn out racial and hateful slurs from a generative deep
learning model (Wallace et al. 2019). Here, we make sure
that humans detect the difference between the original and
final response and then evaluate the model’s capability to de-
tect and differentiate between them. We call the inability (or
under-performance) of models on this as their overstability.
Next, we discuss the various strategies of adversarial per-
turbations. We also categorize them as majorly impacting
syntax, majorly impacting semantics and generative adver-
saries. An overview of all the perturbations is given in Table
1.
3.2 Majorly Syntax-Modifying Adversaries
Syntax-modifying adversaries are those perturbations that
modify the example such that the original meaning (i.e. se-
mantics) of the response is largely retained while the syn-
tax of a sentence unit is modified. These are mostly of the
type MODIFY where word/sentence tokens in a prose are
not deleted or new tokens are not added but existing sen-
tence/word tokens are just modified.
Original Anita is going to the park for a walk.
Subject-verb-object Errors Anita to the park is going for a walk.
Article Errors Anita is going to an park for the walk.
Subject Verb Agreement Errors Anita go to an park for the walk.
Conventional Errors anita go 2 an park 4 the walk
Table 3: Some examples of the type MODGRAMMAR
MODGRAMMAR We formed two test cases to simulate
common grammatical errors committed by students. The
first one focused on changing the subject-verb-object (SVO)
triplet of a sentence. A triplet of this form is selected from
each sentence and jumbled up. In the second test case, we
first induce some article errors by replacing the articles of a
sentence with their common incorrect forms. Then we alter
the subject-verb agreement of that sentence. Following that,
we replace a few selected words with their corresponding
informal conventions and generic slangs. A few examples of
this type of perturbation are given in Table 3.2.
MODFLUENCY This test case is to simulate the involun-
tary disruptions that frequently occur during the flow of a
spoken speech. We induce disfluencies and filler words in
the text to model this test case (Zayats, Ostendorf, and Ha-
jishirzi 2016). For introducing disfluency, we repeat a few
words at the start of each alternate sentence in a paragraph.
For example, I like apples becomes I ... I like apples. For
introducing filler words, we make a list of some common
the filler words 2 and introduce them randomly in sentences
according to the criterion c1. For example, I would like to
tell you a story! is changed to Well...I would like to tell you
hmm...a story!
2Filler words such as “huh”, “uh”, “erm”, “um”, “well”,
“so”, “like”, “hmm”, etc
MODLEXICON In this test case, we use Wordnet synset
(Miller 1995) to replace one word (excluding the stop
words) randomly in each sentence of the response with its
synonym. The motivation behind this was to understand the
variation of scores given by the state-of-the-art AES models
with synonymy relations. For example, “Tom was a happy
man. He lived a simple life.” is changed to “Tom was a
cheerful man. He lived an elementary life.”
SUFFLESENT We randomly shuffled all the sentences of
the response. This ensured that readability and coherence of
the response are affected. Moreover, the transition between
the lines is also lost. Hence, the response will appear discon-
nected to the reader.
3.3 Semantics Modifying Adversaries
Semantics modifying adversaries are those perturbations
which try to modify the meaning of the prose either at a
sentence level or the overall prose level. Through this, we
majorly disturb the coherence, relatedness, specificity and
readability of a response. We do it majorly by three methods.
First, by adding some lines to the response which changes
the meaning of the original response and disturbs its conti-
nuity. Second, we delete some sentences from the original
response which again impacts its readability and complete-
ness. Third, we modify the original response in order to re-
place a few words with some unrelated words. This way the
sentence loses its meaning altogether. While doing all these
perturbations, we take care of the two constraints, c1 and c2
as mentioned in the Section 3.1.
ADDWIKIRELATED We formed a list of important top-
ics from each prompt using key-phrase extraction. The
Wikipedia articles of each of these topics were extracted and
sentence tokenized. Then some sentences were randomly se-
lected from these articles and were added to each response.
ADDWIKIUNRELATED For this test case, we took those
Wiki entries which did not occur in the previous list and per-
formed the same procedure as above. Using these perturba-
tions, we wanted to see the variation of AES scores with
sentences from related and unrelated domains.
ADDSONG We used (PromptCloud 2018; Neisse 2019;
FiveThirtyEight 2019; RakanNimer 2017; Bansal 2020) to
extract 58000 English songs lyrics from a range of years
and genres like Rock, Jazz, Pop, etc. These lyrics are then
appended to the responses according to the constraints c1
and c2.
ADDSPEECH We collected eight speeches of popular
leaders such as Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Hillary Clin-
ton, Queen Elizabeth II, etc. Randomly picked sentences
from this speech corpus are then added to the responses.
The collected speeches with their sources are given in the
supplementary.
ADDRC For reading comprehension based prompts (refer
Table 2), we randomly pick up sentences from the corre-
sponding reading comprehension passage and add them in
the responses.
ADDTRUTH We acquired a list of facts from (Ward 2020).
The motivation behind this test case is the general tendency
of students to add compelling relevant or irrelevant facts in
their response to make it longer and informative, especially
in argumentative based essays.
ADDLIES We designed this test case to evaluate whether
current Automatic Scoring systems are able to identify false
claims or false facts in the student responses. We collected
various false facts and added them to the responses accord-
ing to the constraints mentioned above. Through our exper-
iments, we demonstrate that rubrics for automatic scoring
engines focus entirely on organization, writing skills etc ig-
noring the chance of bluff with these false statements. This
outcome verifies the robustness of AS systems and encour-
ages further research in this direction to make the scoring
systems more secure.
REPEATSENT Students intentionally tend to repeat sen-
tences or specific keywords in their responses in order to
make it longer yet not out of context and to fashion cohe-
sive paragraphs. This highlights the limited vocabulary of
the writer or meagre knowledge and ideas about the main
subject. To deal with this form of a bluff, we concentrated
on three different approaches. Firstly, one or two sentences
from the introduction part are repeated at the end of the re-
sponse. Secondly, one or two sentences from the conclusion
are repeated at the beginning of the response. Thirdly, one to
three sentences are repeated in the middle of the response.
DELSTART To analyze the performance of state-of-the-
art E-Raters on most narrow situations and constraints, we
tested the performance of the AS systems with just the be-
ginning line of the response. This was followed by the first
two lines, the first three lines and so on. Moreover, this
helped to analyze the overall trend on how scoring is affected
by slowly building the response to a complete response.
DELEND Similar to the above testcase, we repeated this
scenario for the last line, last two lines, last three lines and
so on to examine the scoring trend in each case.
DELRAND We removed a fixed percentage of sentences
randomly from the response to interfere and discard the co-
herence This also reduces the length of response. This test-
case highlights the type of responses that may occur when
a student is trying to cheat in an examination by replicat-
ing sentences from some other source. We study this trend
whether AS systems detect the presence of gaps in the ideas
presented in the response.
3.4 Generative Adversaries
BABELGEN These adversarial samples are completely
false samples generated using Les Perelman’s B.S. Essay
Language Generator (BABEL) (Perelman et al. 2014a). BA-
BEL requires a user to enter three keywords based on which
it generates an incoherent, meaningless sample containing a
concoction of obscure words and keywords pasted together.
In 2014, Perelman had showed that ETS’ e-rater which is
M/P 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Range 2-12 1-6 0-3 0-3 0-4 0-4 0-30 0-60
1 7.1 2.5 1.7 1.1 2.2 1.2 13.8 33.9
2 10 4.4 2 2 3 1.2 19.1 43.1
3 6 2 1.1 0.9 1.3 1.3 12.1 21.9
4 8.4 4 3 3 4 3.9 18.4 40.1
5 10.8 5.6 2.8 2.9 3.8 3.8 26.2 53
Table 4: Scores for BABELGEN over all the prompts and
models. Ideally, all of the Babel generated essays should
have been scored a zero. Legend: M: Model (y-axis), P:
Prompt (x-axis), Model Types: 1: LSTM-MoT (Taghipour
and Ng 2016), 2: EASE (EASE 2013), 3: SkipFlow (Tay et
al. 2018), 4: Memory Networks (Zhao et al. 2017), 5: Ad-
versarial Evaluation + BERT (Liu, Xu, and Zhu 2019).
used to grade Graduate Record Exam (GRE) 3 essays con-
sistently 5-6 on a 1-6 point scale (Perelman et al. 2014b;
Strauss 2014). This motivated us to try out the same ap-
proach with the current state-of-the-art deep learning recent
approaches. We came up with a list of keywords based on
the AES questions 4. For generating a response, we chose 3
keywords related to that question and gave it as input to BA-
BEL which then generated a generative adversarial example.
4 Results and Discussion
Tables 4 and 5 report the results for ADDLIES, DELRAND,
ADDSONG, BABELGEN test cases over all the prompts and
models 5. We also give some real randomly chosen exam-
ples from the different test cases in the Figure 4. We observe
that, in general, (Taghipour and Ng 2016) had a very low
N percentage and (Zhao et al. 2017) and (EASE 2013) had
consistently high N percentages. N also varied a lot with
prompt. While some prompts showed a lower percentages
for some test cases (such as Prompt 4 for ADD related test
cases), some had a high percentage for others.
In general, DEL tests impacted the scores negatively.
There were very few instances where scores increase after
removing a few lines. This was also observed by (Perelman
2014) where he stated that word count is the most impor-
tant predictor of an essay’s score. Adding, obscure and diffi-
cult words in place of simpler words increased the scores by
a fraction. Curiously, adding speeches and songs, impacted
the scores on an average positively. It is to be noted that
those speeches or songs were in no way related to the ques-
tion being asked. We tried this out with different genres of
songs. However, the initial experiments showed no partic-
ular genre was preferred by the models. We observed that
ADDLIES test did not succeed as much as the other tests did.
False statements such as “Sun rises in the west” impacted
3GRE is a widely popular exam accepted as the standard ad-
mission requirement for a majority of graduate schools. It is also
used for pre-job screening by a number of companies. Educational
Testing Services (ETS) owns and operates the GRE exam.
4The list is presented along with the code in supplementary
5Due to lack of space, we could present only a small subset of
all the results. Interested readers are encouraged to look into the
supplementary for a complete listing
Figure 1: Adversarial Samples of the type ADDTRUTH, REPEATSENT, ADDSONG, ADDSPEECH, BABELGEN. The original and final scores
of the different models are: (Prompt 5) {1:(3,2), 2:(2,3), 3:(2,2), 4:(2,1), 5:(3,3)}, (Prompt 7) {1:(21,19), 2:(18,20), 3:(18,22), 4:(13,14),
5:(17,16)}, (Prompt 6) {1:(4,4), 2:(2,3), 3:(3,4), 4:(2,2), 5:(2,2)}, (Prompt1) {1:(9,10), 2:(7,8), 3:(5,6), 4:(10,11), 5:(6,6)}. The model num-
bering is the same as given in the Table 5.
M/P 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 (4,21,2,6) (4,19,2,9) (8,27,12,10) (10,28,10,10) (8,35,3,11) (8,52,1,15) (5,19,3,8) (2,10,4,5)
2 (4,3,64,14) (5,3,68,13) (9,3,44,19) (29,22,45,23) (21,7,94,22) (21,7,97,20) (4,3,68,14) (4,3,59,7)
3 (7,5,5,12) (2,2,57,7) (21,9,96,7) (15,24,13,11) (8,4,31,14) (7,5,38,19) (6,5,46,16) (3,2,14,5)
4 (18,23,19,14) (21,20,30,14) (47,29,43,19) (60,35,52,37) (39,22,53,23) (38,16,62,23) (11,17,39,14) (6,5,51,6)
5 (15,14,46,14) (22,14,82,16) (10,35,7,14) (12,34,5,14) (12,30,13,14) (14,28,13,13) (11,22,23,16) (21,12,77,17)
1 (4,21,1,7) (4,19,3,8) (7,26,14,9) (9,28,12,10) (7,35,2,11) (6,53,1,15) (6,19,4,8) (2,10,6,5)
2 (4,3,16,15) (5,4,41,13) (7,3,27,18) (28,23,37,23) (19,6,91,21) (19,4,94,21) (3,3,22,14) (4,3,50,8)
3 (8,4,7,12) (2,2,52,7) (21,7,95,7) (13,24,14,11) (6,4,26,14) (6,5,40,19) (7,5,40,16) (3,2,18,5)
4 (19,23,17,15) (21,21,28,15) (46,30,43,17) (60,35,49,34) (38,23,53,22) (38,17,59,23) (10,18,34,14) (6,5,46,6)
5 (16,14,41,14) (22,14,77,16) (8,35,7,14) (12,35,3,14) (12,30,12,14) (14,29,8,13) (11,22,18,16) (22,12,71,17)
1 (4,22,2,10) (4,18,5,8) (9,27,19,13) (10,28,13,13) (8,35,6,16) (9,51,2,14) (5,19,6,8) (2,10,8,6)
2 (4,3,86,14) (5,3,74,13) (9,3,82,19) (29,22,63,23) (22,6,100,22) (22,7,98,20) (4,3,92,14) (4,3,44,7)
3 (8,5,27,12) (2,2,33,7) (21,8,94,7) (15,24,36,11) (9,4,50,14) (8,5,38,19) (6,5,58,16) (3,2,22,5)
4 (19,23,33,14) (21,20,39,12) (47,29,56,27) (60,34,51,40) (39,21,64,25) (38,16,63,23) (11,17,50,14) (6,5,65,5)
5 (15,14,61,14) (22,14,89,16) (10,35,16,14) (12,34,10,14) (12,30,22,14) (14,28,17,13) (11,22,32,16) (20,12,89,17)
Table 5: Results for ADDLIES, DELRAND, ADDSONG test cases over all the prompts and models. Legend: First sub-table:
ADDLIES to the end such that c1 = 0%, Second sub-table: DELRAND such that c1 = 25% and Third sub-table: ADDSONG
such that c1 = 25% and the injections happen at the beginning of the response. M: Model (y-axis), P: Prompt (x-axis),
Model Types: 1: LSTM-MoT (Taghipour and Ng 2016), 2: EASE (EASE 2013), 3: SkipFlow (Tay et al. 2018), 4: Memory
Networks (Zhao et al. 2017), 5: Adversarial Evaluation + BERT (Liu, Xu, and Zhu 2019). The entry in the tuple represents
(µpos, µneg, Npos, σ). All the values are in percentages and rounded to the nearest integer.
scores negatively in many cases. We believe this is due to
the reason that most models used contextual word embed-
dings as inputs to their models. This may have negatively
impacted the scores.
Another category of test case BABELGEN. Ideally, this
should have been scored a zero but almost all the models
scored at least 60% to the generated essays. This strongly
suggests that models were looking for obscure keywords
with complex sentence formation. We also observed that
modifying grammar did not affect the scores much or af-
fected it negatively. This is largely in congruence with the
rubrics of the questions where it was indicated that gram-
mar should not be valued for scoring. However, unexpect-
edly, in some cases after changing the grammar of the whole
response, we observed that scores started increasing. A few
examples demonstrating this are given in the supplementary.
4.1 Human Annotation Results
In order to validate that most of our tests are such that they
are perceived as negatively impacting scoring, we chose a
few test cases based on the following three conditions: 1)
Where N < Nneg , 2) Where µneg > 10% and 3) Where
a T-test rejects the hypothesis that the adversarial and origi-
nal scores are the same distribution. The motivation behind
setting these three conditions was that we wanted to choose
those test-cases where the model is the most confident in
Figure 2: Results of adversarial training for Prompt 2,3,5,7 in clockwise order. The x-axis shows chosen test-cases and y-axis shows 4
metrics: {µpos, µneg, Npos, σ}. Representations: The solid lines denoted by metricsame : Value of metric with adversarial training done
over the data generated by the same test case, the dashed lines denoted by metricdiff : Value of metric with adversarial training done over
the data generated by a different test case, the dotted lines denoted by metricoriginal : Value of metric with no adversarial training done
# Perturbation Score ↓% % People ↓ % People ↑ Common Reasons of ↓ Common Reasons of ↑
1 MODFLUENCY 28.1 82.7 4.8 Std English, Readability More appropriate
2 SHUFFLE 24.2 68.6 14.5 Transitions ,Organization, Relevance None
3 MODGRAMMAR 39.5 91.3 6.2 Grammar, Conventions, Readability None
4 ADDWIKIRELATED 38.2 87.2 11.3 Readability, Relevance, Conventions Transitions
5 REPEATSENT 15.6 71.6 13.6 Organization, Relevance, Repetition Clarity
6 ADDLIES 23.9 79.9 10.6 Relevance, Organization Conventions
7 ADDTRUTH 29.2 88.6 8.6 Relevance, Readability Organization
8 ADDSONG 32.8 91.8 3.2 Relevance, Organization, Grammar Both equal
9 DELRAND 38.2 87.2 11.3 Transitions, Organization Same, More appropriate
Table 6: Human Annotation Results. (↓ represents a decrease and ↑ represents an increase. Therefore, ‘% People ↓’ denotes the
percentage of people who scored the adversarial response worse than the original response)
scoring adversarial response as negative. Through this, we
can show that even while being confident, they still lack in
penalizing scores adequately. In all other test-cases, models
are either marking the perturbations as better than the orig-
inal (N > Nneg) or not detecting any significant difference
(second and third conditions), both of which are wrong pre-
sumptions by the model.
Table 6 depicts the results for human annotations. We
divide the annotators into two groups. For the first group,
we show them the original response and its corresponding
score and then ask the annotators to score the adversarial re-
sponse accordingly. For the second group, we ask them to
score both the original and adversarial responses. If any of
the annotators felt that the scores of the original and adver-
sarial responses should not be the same, we ask them to list
supporting reasons. For uniformity in responses, we derive
a set of scoring rubrics extracted mentioned in our dataset
and ask them to choose the most suitable ones. As observed
from Table 6, the percentage of people who scored adversar-
ial responses lower than original responses are significantly
higher for all selected test-cases. The main reasons for scor-
ing adversarial responses lower by annotators are Relevance,
Organization, Readability etc.. It can be observed that the %
lowering in score was on an average of 30%.
4.2 Adversarial Training
Finally, we tried training on the adversarial samples gener-
ated by our framework to see if the models are able to pick
up some inherent “pattern” of the adversarial samples. Since
there is a multitude of adversarial test cases category, we
narrowed a subcategory of five test cases from those shown
for the human annotations. They were selected such that on
an average, these test cases had maximum deviation between
human annotated scores and machine scores. The train data
consisted of an equal number of original samples and ad-
versarial samples. The target scores of adversarial samples
was set as the original score minus the mean difference of
scores between original and human annotated scores. For
example according to the human annotation study, for the
MODGRAMMAR case, the mean difference was 2 points be-
low the original score, so all the samples were scored as orig-
inal scores minus 2 points in the simulated training data. The
simulated training data was then appended with original and
shuffled. The testing was conducted with the respective ad-
versarial test-case as well as the others. The results for the
same is shown in Figure 4. It is evident that the adversarial
training improves the scores marginally for all four metrics,
as shown by the solid lines being higher than the dotted lines.
However a slightly visible improvement in scores is inappar-
ent. The Npos increases for adversarial training, highest for
the respective test-case.Similar trend is observed for µpos
metric.For µneg , the adversarial training reduces this score
for respective test-case , as compared to non-adversarial test-
ing.
5 Conclusion
Through our experiments. we conclude that recent AES sys-
tems built mainly with feature extraction techniques and
deep neural networks based algorithms fail to recognize the
presence of common-sense adversaries in student essays and
responses. As these common adversaries are popular among
students for ‘bluffing’ during examinations, it is vital for Au-
tomated Scoring system developers to think beyond accura-
cies of their systems and pay attention to complete robust-
ness so that these systems are not vulnerable to any form of
adversarial attack.
References
Ajay, H. B.; Tillet, P.; and Page, E. B. 1973. Analysis of essays
by computer (aec-ii). US Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Office of Education, National Center for Educational Re-
search and Development, Washington, DC, Tech. Rep 10:1–13.
ASAP-AES. 2012. The hewlett foundation: Automated essay scor-
ing develop an automated scoring algorithm for student-written es-
says. urlhttps://www.kaggle.com/c/asap-aes/.
Bansal, H. 2020. Song lyrics data. https://www.kaggle.com/
hiesenberg/song-lyrics-data.
Devlin, J.; Chang, M.-W.; Lee, K.; and Toutanova, K. 2018. Bert:
Pre-training of deep bidirectional transformers for language under-
standing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.04805.
EASE, E. 2013. Ease (enhanced ai scoring engine) is a library that
allows for machine learning based classification of textual content.
this is useful for tasks such as scoring student essays. https://github.
com/edx/ease.
FiveThirtyEight. 2019. Fivethirtyeight hip hop candidate lyrics
dataset. https://www.kaggle.com/fivethirtyeight/fivethirtyeight-
hip-hop-candidate-lyrics-dataset.
Kumar, Y.; Aggarwal, S.; Mahata, D.; Shah, R. R.; Kumaraguru,
P.; and Zimmermann, R. 2019. Get it scored using autosasan au-
tomated system for scoring short answers. In Proceedings of the
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 33, 9662–9669.
Liu, J.; Xu, Y.; and Zhu, Y. 2019. Automated essay scoring based
on two-stage learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.07744.
Miller, G. A. 1995. Wordnet: a lexical database for english. Com-
munications of the ACM 38(11):39–41.
Neisse, A. 2019. Song lyrics from 6 musical genres. https://www.
kaggle.com/neisse/scrapped-lyrics-from-6-genres/.
Perelman, L.; Sobel, L.; Beckman, M.; and Jiang, D. 2014a. Ba-
sic automatic b.s. essay language generator (babel). https://babel-
generator.herokuapp.com/.
Perelman, L.; Sobel, L.; Beckman, M.; and Jiang, D. 2014b.
Basic automatic b.s. essay language generator (babel) by les
perelman, ph.d. http://lesperelman.com/writing-assessment-robo-
grading/babel-generator/.
Perelman, L. 2014. When the state of the art is counting words.
Assessing Writing 21:104–111.
PromptCloud. 2018. Taylor swift song lyrics from all the
albums. https://www.kaggle.com/PromptCloudHQ/taylor-swift-
song-lyrics-from-all-the-albums.
RakanNimer. 2017. Billboard 1964-2015 songs + lyrics. https://
www.kaggle.com/rakannimer/billboard-lyrics/discussion/142574.
Reinertsen, N., et al. 2018. Why can’t it mark this one?: A qual-
itative analysis of student writing rejected by an automated essay
scoring system. English in Australia 53(1):52.
Shermis, M. D., and Hamner, B. 2012. Contrasting state-of-the-art
automated scoring of essays: Analysis. In Annual national council
on measurement in education meeting, 14–16.
Spolsky, B. 1995. Measured words: The development of objetive
language testing. Oxford University Press.
Strauss, V. 2014. Is mit researcher being censored by educational
testing service?. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2014/10/24/is-mit-researcher-being-censored-by-
educational-testing-service/?arc404=true.
Szegedy, C.; Zaremba, W.; Sutskever, I.; Bruna, J.; Erhan, D.;
Goodfellow, I.; and Fergus, R. 2013. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199.
Taghipour, K., and Ng, H. T. 2016. A neural approach to automated
essay scoring. In Proceedings of the 2016 conference on empirical
methods in natural language processing, 1882–1891.
Tay, Y.; Phan, M. C.; Tuan, L. A.; and Hui, S. C. 2018. Skipflow:
Incorporating neural coherence features for end-to-end automatic
text scoring. In Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence.
Wallace, E.; Feng, S.; Kandpal, N.; Gardner, M.; and Singh, S.
2019. Universal adversarial triggers for attacking and analyzing
nlp. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.07125.
Ward, L. 2020. 1000 random & interesting facts about literally
everything. https://www.thefactsite.com/1000-interesting-facts/.
West-Smith, P.; Butler, S.; and Mayfield, E. 2018. Trustworthy
automated essay scoring without explicit construct validity. In 2018
AAAI Spring Symposium Series.
Whitlock, J. W. 1964. Automatic data processing in education.
Macmillan.
Zayats, V.; Ostendorf, M.; and Hajishirzi, H. 2016. Dis-
fluency detection using a bidirectional lstm. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1604.03209.
Zhao, S.; Zhang, Y.; Xiong, X.; Botelho, A.; and Heffernan, N.
2017. A memory-augmented neural model for automated grading.
In Proceedings of the Fourth (2017) ACM Conference on Learn-
ing@ Scale, 189–192.
